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Consent Decrees and the EPA:
Are They Really Enforceable
Against the Agency?
I. Introduction
In recent years, a number of suits have been brought
against administrative agencies to compel actions
mandated by their enabling statutes.' While some of these
cases have been settled by litigation,2 others have been
settled by negotiation. 3 Considerations of economy militate
strongly in favor of the negotiated settlement and
settlement agreements have received the imprimatur of
both Congress 4 and the courts. 5 A settlement agreement can
be made judicially enforceable through incorporation of its
terms into a consent decree. When the defendant is an
administrative agency, however, the issuance of such a
consent decree may strain traditional attitudes concerning
1. The Administrative Procedure Act includes within its provisions for judicial
review the power to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed." Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1982).
2. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 519 F. 2d 287 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir.
1975). See generally Hall, The Evolution and Implementation of EPA's Regulatory
Program to Control the Discharge of Toxic Pollutants to the Nation's Waters, 10
Nat. Resources Law. 515 (1977).
3. See, e.g., Neighborhood Preservation Coalition v. Claytor, 553 F.Supp. 919
(E.D. Pa 1982) (Dept. of Transportation); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120 (D.D.C. 1976).
4. The Administrative Procedure Act shows an express preference for
negotiated settlements over litigation stating in relevant part:
[Tihe agency shall give all interested parties opportunities for-(l)...offers of settlement...and
(2) to the extent that parties are unable so to determine a controversy by consent, hearing and
decision on notice and in accordance with section 566 and 557 of this title.
Administrative Procedure Act § 5, 5 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1982).
5. Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n Local 550 v. American Airlines,
Inc., 573 F.2d 960 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); Autera v. Robinson,
419 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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separation of powers and judicial deference to agency
expertise. This situation arose in a recent decision of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia: Citizens for a
Better Environment v. Gorsuch.6
In Citizens for a Better Environment, a consent decree
mandating Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
action in the development and promulgation of regulations
under the Clean Water Act (CWA) 7 was challenged by
industry-intervenors. The decree required EPA actions
which the court could not have imposed in the absence of the
agency's consent. These requirements were alleged to
constitute an impermissible infringement on
administrative discretion.8 During the litigation, the
intervenors also had claimed that EPA should be required
to comply with Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
provisions for public notice and comment prior to
finalization of the agreement.9 Although the court upheld
the propriety of the decree and the lack of procedural
formalities, much of its argument relied upon the fact that
the initial formulation of the agreement was an exercise of
agency discretion. 10
This note discusses two issues concerning the
fundamental relationship between the courts and
administrative agencies in the context of Citizens for a
Better Environment. The utilization of a consent decree in
the settlement of this litigation is significant to both issues.
6. Citizens for a Better Env't v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
7. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1981) (amending and renaming Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976).
8. This issue was originally raised by the D.C. Circuit, sua sponte, in an earlier
appeal of this case. Environmental Defense Fund v. Costel, 636 F. 2d 1229 1258
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
9. Environmental Defense Fund v. Costel, 636 F.2d 1229, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1833
(D.D.C. 1979); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 2120 (D.D.C. 1976).
10. Agency participation was significant in the court's discussion of the extent
of judicial intrusion in the finding that "Vermont Yankee's concern for 'judicially
conceived notions of administrative fair play' [was] inapposite"; and in finding
that the decree does not improperly impose a particular course of action since
EPA's participation in the settlement agreement was voluntary. Citizens for a
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol1/iss2/3
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The first issue focuses on the consent decree as a tool. Courts
are frequently faced with the task of balancing traditional
deference to agency discretion with the requirements of
public participation and procedural due process. This task
is further complicated when policy considerations in favor
of negotiated settlements are introduced. How this
complication is resolved will reflect on the continuing utility
of consent decrees in settling litigation brought against
administrative agencies.
The second issue involves the requirement of public
participation in agency actions. The extent to which public
participation in agency rulemaking is required is defined by
the APA,1 and has been clarified by various courts. 12 In the
cases preceding Citizens for a Better Environment,
however, the courts found that these requirements were
inapplicable since they did not characterize the settlement
agreement as rulemaking. 13 Substantive questions
concerning the procedural adequacy of this approach are
considered. An alternative approach to encourage
negotiated settlements without this potential defect is also
discussed.
II. Citizens for a Better Environment
Between 1973 and 1975 several suits were filed' 4 which
challenged EPA's methods for regulation of toxic pollutants
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA).15
These actions were consolidated and a detailed negotiated
settlement imposing substantial obligations on the EPA
Better Env 't, 718 F.2d 1117, 1128-29 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
11. Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
12. See, e.g., American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. ICC, 659 F.2d 452 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1272 (1983); Guardian Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v.
Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
13. Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1833,
1839 (D.D.C. 1979).
14. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 16 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 2084, 2086 (D.D.C. 1982).
15. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1981).
3
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was reached. 16 Representatives of various regulated
industries intervened in the case, alleging that notice and
comment procedures should have been followed in the
16. The complete text of the settlement agreement is included in the decision in
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120
(D.D.C. 1976). The terms of the agreement included:
1. requirements that the EPA develop and promulgate regulations to establish
effluent limitations and guidelines for classes and categories of point sources
applying a best available technology economically feasible standard. Various
criteria to be met by these regulations were also specified and a deadline for
achievement or results established.
2. requirements for the promulgation of regulations establishing national
performance standards for classes and categories of new point sources which
would reflect the greatest effluent reduction achievable using the best available
demonstrated control technology. If practical, these standards should permit
no discharge of pollutants.
3. requirements for the development and promulgation of regulations to
establish pretreatment standards for the introduction of pollutants into
publicly owned treatment works for those pollutants found to be unsusceptible
to or incompatible with treatment by such treatment works.
4. a list of 65 priority pollutants for which the promulgation of effluent
limitations and guidelines and pretreatment standards was required.
5. requirements for the promulgation of regulations limiting effluents from all
point sources categories listed in the agreement.
6. the requirement that effluent limitations, pretreatment standards and new
source performance standards must apply to at least 95% of the point sources
within each of the listed categories.
7. a schedule for the engagement of contractors to study the various listed
categories of point sources and for the subsequent publication of proposed and
final regulations in the Federal Register. The studies were to be undertaken in
the order of priority set forth in the agreement unless the Administrator deems
that the goals and purposes of the act would be better served by changing the
prioritization.
8. provisions for excluding, for point source category, a specific pollutant upon a
finding that i) equal or more stringent protection is already provided by an
existing regulation, ii) the pollutant is present in the discharge of a point source
only to the extent that it is present in the intake waters, or iii) the pollutant is
either not present or present only in trace amounts which are neither causing,
nor likely to cause toxic effects. Provisions were also included for the exclusion
of point source categories from pretreatment standards i) if 95% of all sources
within a category introduce only pollutants susceptible to treatment or ii) if the
toxicity of pollutants introduced to the treatment works is so insignificant as to
not justify a pretreatment regulation.
9. a provision for reports to the plaintiff environmental groups.
10. a requirement that all regulations promulgated pursuant to the agreement
would be enforced to the full extent of the Administrator's authority as
expeditiously as possible.
11. the requirement that EPA compile and publish the known health effects of
the listed pollutants along with recommended maximum permissible
concentrations consistent with the protection of aquatic life, human health, and
recreational activities.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol1/iss2/3
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formulation of the agreement. Over these objections, the
settlement agreement was incorporated into a consent
decree issued by the district court. The court stated that
"[t]he agreement merely requires the EPA to initiate
rulemaking proceedings,"and indicated that the
intervenors would have the opportunity to challenge
regulations proposed pursuant to the decree through
normal rulemaking procedures. 17
In 1978, following amendments to the FWPCA which
incorporated several aspects of the consent decree, 18 the
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) moved to have
EPA found in contempt for failure to comply with the
deadlines set forth in the decree. This dispute was settled
again by negotiation and a modified agreement was
presented to the court.' 9  Meanwhile, the industrial
intervenors moved to have the decree vacated on the
12. that more stringent effluent limitations and guidelines would be established
for any listed pollutants where the ordinary standards would be insufficient to
assure protection of public water supplies, agricultural and industrial uses, the
protection of aquatic life forms, and to allow recreational activities in and on the
water. The Administrator was also required to establish a program with the
objective and capability of determining whether more stringent effluent
limitations, guidelines and standards are necessary under this paragraph.
13. the requirement for promulgation of regulations concerning pretreatment
standards for pollutants found to be unsusceptible to or incompatible with
publicly owned treatment works. These standards would be based on the best
practicable control technology currently available and a schedule for
compliance was set forth.
14.the requirement that the Administrator propose standards and promulgate
regulations pursuant to § 307(a) for DDT, endrin, aldrin/dieldrin, toxaphene,
benzidine, and polychlorinated biphenyls. Deadlines for the proposal and
promulgation of these regulations were established.
17. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
2120, 2121 (D.D.C. 1976).
18. In particular, the 1977 amendments adopted the industry-by- industry, "best
available technology economically achievable" approach of the agreement and
certain critical factors to be considered in establishing a standard (e.g. toxicity
degradability and persistence). It also incorporated the list of pollutants included
in the agreement as specifically requiring attention. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-217, §53 (a), 91 Stat. 1589 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (Supp.
V 1981)).
19. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1833 (D.D.C. 1979).
5
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grounds that the decree was superseded by the 1977
amendments, that the lawsuits underlying the agreement
were moot, 20 and that the modifications to the settlement
were a violation of the public notice and comment
requirements of the APA. 21 The court denied the
intervenors' motion and entered the modified decree. 22
On appeal, the decision of the district court was affirmed
as to each of the intervenors' three arguments. 23 In support
of this holding, the D.C. Circuit Court examined the 1977
amendments to the FWPCA and the discussions that
accompanied their enactment. It found that Congress had
been silent as to an intention to supersede the agreement 24
and that the proper inference to be drawn from the
legislative history was "that Congress expected the
settlement agreement to remain in effect." 25 On the issue of
mootness, the court held that the district court did not err in
upholding the agreement on the basis of the two cases
which were not moot.26
Concerning the final contention of the intervenors, the
court held that the modifications were not "rules" within
the meaning of the APA. Rather, the modifications should
20. Id. at 1837-38. NRDC conceded that two of the original cases had been
mooted by the 1977 amendments and the court assumed this to be the case in
framing its decision.
21. Intervenors failed to raise objections on notice and comment grounds to the
original settlement agreement, so the scope of this objection was limited to the
modifications. Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229, 1255 n.9
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
22. The modifications to the agreement extend the deadlines for EPA
promulgation of the regulations required under the original agreement; broaden
EPA's powers to exclude not only pollutants but entire categories or sub-categories
of point sources; extend the time for the development of pretreatment standards for
incompatible pollutants not specifically mentioned in the agreement and require a
program to study and identify other pollutants which are either unsusceptible to or
incompatible with publicly owned treatment works; and set forth more specific
criteria for the imposition of more stringent health-based standards than were
included in the original agreement.
23. Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
24. Id. at 1242.
25. Id. at 1244.
26. See supra note 20.
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be considered as requirements to "initiate preliminary
investigations as a first step toward determining whether or
not to promulgate regulations." 27 The intervenors also
alleged that the modifications imposed substantial
obligations upon the agency. Starting from this premise,
the court raised, sua sponte, the issue of whether the consent
decree "impermissibly infringes on the discretion Congress
committed to the Administrator to make certain decisions
under the statute." 28 The case was remanded to the district
court for consideration of this issue.
On remand, the district court emphasized that the issue
was "'impermissible' infringement of the Administrator's
discretion, not just an infringement" since, " any judicial
decision compelling agency action infringes to some degree
on an agency's discretion." 29 Four factors were extracted
from prior case law as necessary to validate a court's use of
its equitable powers to effectuate a remedial statute. 30 First,
there must be a finding of unlawful or impermissible agency
activity. The court found that "the aggregate record of the
EPA with regard to the regulation of toxic pollutants can be
considered equivalent to administrative action unlawfully
withheld." 31 Second, the court must not fashion a decree
which dictates the substantive results of agency action. The
modifications to the decree were found to be "process-
oriented" and therefore permissible. 32 The final two factors
27. Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
28. Id. at 1259.
29. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 16 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 2084, 2087 (D.D.C. 1982).
30. Id. at 2087-89. Most of the cases relied upon did not involve consent decrees.
Rather they were cases of court fashioned equitable decrees enforceable against
an unwilling agency.
31. Id. at 2088. Contrary to this view, the Department of Justice, writing on
behalf of EPA, maintained that "entry of a settlement agreement does not
constitute an admission of liability." Brief for Federal Appellees Anne M. Gorsuch
at 13, n.10, Citizens for a Better Env't v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
32. The apparent conflict ofthis statement with the Supreme Court's decision in
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
was not addressed by the district court. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). See supra note 10.
153
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relate to the participation of the parties in the formulation of
the decree and the court's willingness to entertain
subsequent motions for modification. In approving this
decree, the court stressed the extensive participation of the
agency 33 and the resulting decrease in judicial intrusion. In
addition, the court not only expressed its willingness to
modify the decree, it in fact did so on several occasions. 34
Since each of the four factors was satisfied, and since the
court viewed the 1977 amendments to the CWA as an
implicit ratification of the agreement, the court upheld the
validity of the decree. This decision was appealed by the
industry-intervenors.
The D.C. Circuit, in a split decision, affirmed the lower
court's ruling. Much of the opinion rests on the singular fact
that, in this case, EPA consented to the decree. 35 The court
stated that, because of EPA participation in the formulation
of the decree, "the Decree do[es] not represent judicial
intrusion into the Agency's affairs to the same extent [it]
would if the Decree were'a creature of judicial cloth."' 36 This
rationale was used to find that the proscriptions of Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. against the imposition of procedural
requirements 37 were inapposite since the agreement was
"the work of the agency itself."38 Similarly, cases limiting
the power of the court in areas of "internal management
matters" or where it was the intention of Congress to leave
33. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 16 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 2084, 2087 (D.D.C. 1982).
34. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1833 (D.D.C. 1979); Citizens for a Better Env't, 718 F.2d, 1117, 1122 n.6 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
35. See supra note 10.
36. Citizens for a Better Env't, 718 F.2d 1117, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing
Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, 454 U.S. 139,
141 (1981)).
37. In Vermont Yankee the Supreme Court reiterated some of the limits on
judicial review, stating that a court should "not stray beyond the judicial province
to explore the procedural format or to impose upon the agency its own notion of
which procedures are 'best.' " 435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978).
38. Citizens for a Better Env't, 718 F.2d 1117, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol1/iss2/3
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matters covered in a court order to agency discretion were
deemed inapplicable because EPA had voluntarily entered
into the settlement agreement. 39
III. Discussion
A. Negotiated Settlements and Consent Decrees
The negotiated settlement of disputes involving
administrative agencies is clearly a favored course. The
Administrative Procedure Act expressly prefers negotiation
to litigation 40 and the courts have applauded the savings of
time and money to be gained by this practice.41 In more
traditional circumstances where the agency is cast in the
role of plantiff, rather than defendant, the number of cases
settled by negotiation is quite large. 42 These negotiations
incorporate the agency's conception of the public interest
and the technical and economic practicalities of a given
situation and present a clear exercise of administrative
discretion which the courts have readily enforced. 43
Similar considerations of economy and a desire to reduce
39. Id. at 1129. (Referring to National Ass'n of Postal Supervisors v. United
States Postal Serv., 602 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
40. See supra note 4.
41. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223 (1974); United
States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971).
42. Numerous cases for anti-trust violations are settled through negotiation by
the FTC. The Department of Justice is required to publish notice of these
settlements in the Federal Register prior to their approval. Similar requirements
have been imposed for settlement of cases brought against alleged polluters by
EPA. 28 C.F.R. § 50.7 (1983). Since the promulgation of 28 C.F.R. § 50.7 in mid-
1980, in excess of 240 consent decrees have been proposed in cases of this type (as
determined by LEXIS search of the Federal Register for references to 28 C.F.R. §
50.7). See also Rikleen, Negotiating Superfund Settlement Agreements, 10 Envt'l
Affairs 697 (1982).
43. In the area of antitrust, concern that courts were merely "rubberstamping"
agency settlements led Congress to enact the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties
Act which required courts to consider each settlement in terms of the public
interest. See generally Branfman, Antitrust Consent Decrees-A Review and
Evaluation of the First Seven Years Under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties
Act, 27 Antitrust Bull. 303 (1982).
9
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the risks of litigation are relevant to the situation where an
agency is the defendant. If an agency chooses to negotiate a
settlement agreement this is in itself an act of discretion.
The question is, does a court have the power to enforce this
choice at a later time when the agency may prefer a different
course of action. In Citizens for a Better Environment, the
view propounded by the appellant industries and accepted
by the dissent was that the court's power in this respect was
properly limited to approval of those provisions which it
could have imposed upon the agency had the case gone to
trial.44 In this context, the observation of Judge Wilkey in
his dissent is worth noting. He suggests that "[t]he value of
the consent decree.. .depends on the court's willingness to
enforce it should the agency wish to adopt other procedures
consistent with the act. The consent decree has no practical
significance so long as the agency remains willing to follow
voluntarily its provisions. ' 45
The majority noted that NRDC and EPA do not contest
the assertion that some provisions of the decree are not
statutorily mandated, 46 but concluded that the
acquiescence of the agency compensated for any
overbreadth in the terms of the settlement agreement and
made it proper for the court to issue the order.47 It is the
presence of these provisions, which would be beyond the
power of the court to impose in the. absence of agency
consent, in concert with the possibility of eventual
nonacquiescence by the agency which give rise to some of
the problems in Citizens for a Better Environment. If the
courts apply different standards to determine the propriety
of initially entering a consent decree from those used when
enforcement becomes necessary, the efficacy of consent
decrees in encouraging negotiated settlements will be
reduced. A plaintiff may be unwilling to surrender his rights
44. Citizens for a Better Env't, 718 F.2d 1117, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wilkey, J.,
dissenting).
45. Id. at 1131 n.4.
46. Id. at 1124.
47. See supra note 10.
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to a promising litigation in exchange for a negotiated
settlement that is not binding upon the agency.48 A court
should remain aware of the parties' expectations if a court
order is entered and take steps to insure its enforceability.
These concerns about enforceability are relevant at two
stages in the litigation. At the outset, the deference
traditionally given to exercises of administrative discretion
must not be allowed to negate requirements for public
participation in agency actions merely because a negotiated
settlement is involved. Otherwise, such a procedural defect
might form the basis for later unenforceability of the decree.
The court must also be willing to enforce the decree against
an agency which would prefer an alternative course of
action. Otherwise, the consent decree might become little
more than a sham, with courts acting as agency tools in the
avoidance or deferral of litigation.
B. Public Participation in Agency Activities
The second issue in Citizens for a Better Environment
involves the need for public participation in agency
activities. Public policy is concerned with the continuing
accountability of agencies for their actions. Congress and
the courts have recognized this fact and have developed
restraints upon agencies to insure public participation in
agency functions. 49 As an exercise of agency discretion, a
48. In Plaintiffs' Memorandum Regarding Matters Raised at the April 30, 1976
Status Conference, May 7,1976 NRDC noted that "[pilaintiffs' willingness to sign
this Agreement rather than to litigate the lawsuits is fundamentally premised
upon the understanding that the Court is prepared to exercise its full powers to
ensure the effective and timely implementation of the Agreement and to enforce
compliance with its term (sic) and conditions." Brief for Appellees. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. at 8, Citizens for a Better Env't v. Gorsuch, 718
F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
49. For its part, Congress has enacted the APA which includes provisions that
"give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through
the submission of written data, views, or arguments." Administrative Procedure
Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982). In addition, the APA sets forth standards for
judicial review of agency action. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. §
706 (1982). In applying these standards, the courts have recognized the need for
agency independence but have overturned agency decisions for a failure to meet
157
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consent decree should be no less susceptible to these
restraints than other rulemaking or adjudicatory
proceedings. Judicial approval of a settlement agreement
without consideration of these limits, in their entirety, could
permit an agency to circumvent legislative intent and
would be contrary to the expectations of Congress. 50
The settlement decree negotiated in Citizens for a Better
Environment exemplifies how excessive deference to
agency discretion can lead to an avoidance of requirements
for public participation. 5 1 The APA defines a rule as " the
whole or a part of an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to
implement, interpret or prescribe law or policy or describing
the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an
agency ..... ,5 2 This definition is broad and could be construed
to "encompass virtually any utterance by an agency." 53 In
recognition of the potential limitations on agency
efficiency, Congress included specific circumstances where
the notice and comment provisions of section 553 would not
apply. These exceptions cover "interpretive rules, general
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization,
procedure, or practice." 54 Numerous cases have tested the
limits of these exceptions 55 which have, in general, been
the APA requirements, including a failure to observe required procedural
measures. United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973);
American Bus Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1980). But see
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519 (1978).
50. The Senate Committee considering the APA placed upon the courts a
"duty...to prevent avoidance of the requirements of the bill by any manner or form
of indirection." American Bus Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 528 (D.D.C.
1980) (citing S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 217 (1946)).
51. The D.C. Circuit has noted that "although...due deference should be paid to
an agency, .A..the deference...cannot be allowed to slip into judicial inertia."
Diplomat Lakewood, Inc. v. Harris, 613 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1979). A precise
definition of excessive deference may, however, be difficult to establish.
52. Administrative Procedure Act § 2, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1982).
53. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
54. Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (A) (1982).
55. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of The United States v. Occupational
Health and Safety Admin., 636 F.2d 464 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Guardian Fed. Sav. &
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol1/iss2/3
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narrow since "[t]he salutary effect of the Act's public
comment procedures cannot be gainsaid, so only
reluctantly should courts recognize exemptions
therefrom." 56
In deciding whether compliance with APA notice and
comment requirements was necessary, the courts looked
beyond the broad definition of a "rule" and its statutory
exceptions and found that "Congress [had not] intended the
definition of 'rule' to reach modification of judicial
settlements such as that in the present case,"5 7 or that "the
modifications are not 'rules' within the meaning of the APA
for which EPA was required to comply with the statute's
notice and comment provisions."58  The settlement
agreement was deemed to be too "preliminary to the
rulemaking process" to constitute rulemaking. 59 Instead,
the regulations ultimately proposed and promulgated could
be challenged by the regulated parties.60 Thus, the agency
Loan Ass'n v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
56. Humana of South Carolina v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1070, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
57. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1833, 1839 (D.D.C. 1979).
58. Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
The context of this statement implies that the court does not consider the
modifications to be rules, rather than that they are rules exempt under the
Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1982). The district court did
hold hearings on the proposed agreement and "allowed interested parties to file
comments." Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229, 1235 (D.D.C.
(1979). The method used for giving notice of these hearings and whither it afforded
"all interested parties...an opportunity to participate" is not clear. NLRB v.
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764-65 (1969). In any event, these hearings were
conducted after the agreement was substantially complete. As noted in
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, "[t]he
constitutional infirmity ... created by the failure...to accord...notice and an
opportunity for hearing, is not cured by the fact that the district court later
accorded a hearing on the due process claim in the context of approving the
consent decree." 616 F.2d 1006, 1020 (7th Cir. 1980) (Pell, J., dissenting).
59. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1833, 1839 (D.D.C. 1979).
60. Id.
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was not limited by these procedural requirements in the
formulation of the agreement.
Two specific procedural questions can be raised based on
these dismissals of the intervenors' claims. First, were the
requirements of the agreement as preliminary as the district
court viewed them; and second, does the ability to challenge
the rules eventually promulgated offset the detrimental
effects of limited participation in the formulation of the
settlement agreement.
The first procedural question concerns the preliminary
nature of the settlement agreement. In support of its finding
that the agreement merely required the initiation of
rulemaking proceedings, the district court stated that
"paragraph eight of the' settlement agreement expressly
provides that the EPA may delete pollutants or point
sources when, in its discretion, regulation would not be
necessary." 61 An inspection of paragraph eight shows,
however, that while it does permit the exclusion of
pollutants or point sources from regulation, the
circumstances under which this exclusion is appropriate
are carefully delineated. It is important to remember that
there is a difference "between rules, however discretionary
in form, that effectively circumscribe administrative choice,
and rules that contemplate that the administrator will
exercise an informed discretion in the various cases that
arise."' 62 The terms of this agreement do not leave the
administrator the full range of options potentially available
and thus should not fall within the exclusion to the notice
and comment requirements of the APA.63
Intervenors also challenged the modifications to the
61. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
2120, 2122 (D.D.C. 1976).
62. Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589
F.2d 658, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussing the requirements for a rule to meet the
general statement of policy exemption).
63. A court may not fashion a decree to require an agency to use certain options
of the total range of options available to it. Watt v. Energy Action Educational
Foundation, 454 U.S. 151 (1981).
[Vol. 1
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agreement. 64 Both the district court and the D.C. Circuit
viewed the modifications as being actions too preliminary
to constitute rulemaking. 65 The circuit court also noted that
had EPA adopted the regulatory programs required by the
agreement "outside the context of a judicial proceeding" it
would not have been subject to notice and comment
requirements. 66 Decisions of the administrator on the
conduct of investigatory programs would ordinarily be
exempt from the notice and comment requirements as
"rules of agency... procedure or practice." 67 This is
especially true where the rules are formulated "primarily to
facilitate the development of relevant information" 6 and
act as "mere aids to the exercise of the agency's independent
discretion."6 9 Under ordinary circumstances, however,
64. In considering the modifications to the agreement, the district court noted
four substantive changes. One of these involved extension of the deadlines for
promulgation of regulations. Changes were also made in paragraph eight which
permit the Administrator to exclude whole categories or subcategories of point
sources from regulation. As in the original agreement, however, such exclusions
can only be made under specific circumstances. See Modification of Settlement
Agreement, para. 5, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 12 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1833, 1842 (D.D.C. 1979). The third change is characterized by the
court as "provid[ing] EPA with additional time and flexibility to develop
pretreatment standards for incompatible pollutants beyond the 65 pollutants
specifically mentioned in the Agreement." Id. at 1839. This increase in flexibility
is achieved by limiting the required regulations to unlisted pollutants which are
deemed to "pose a significant threat." Another change is also added to this
section, however, which requires EPA to undertake a study to identify other
pollutants which are incompatible with the treatment works or which are not
susceptible to treatment. In addition to specifying a date for completion of this
study, the new paragraph also sets forth details on the technical methods to be
used. Modification of Settlement Agreement, para. 3, id. at 1841. Finally, the
modification "clarifies paragraph 12 of the Agreement by specifying in more
detail the investigatory steps EPA must take to determine when and if effluent
limitations more stringent than the technology based-limitations...are
necessary...." (emphasis added). Id. at 1839.
65. Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229,1255 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1833,
1839 (D.D.C. 1979).
66. Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
67. Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (A) (1982).
68. American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532,538 (1970).
69. Id. at 539.
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these rules are formulated as matters of internal policy and
have not been incorporated into a court order and given the
force of law.
The terms of the settlement agreement and the
subsequent modifications exceed these descriptions of
preliminary agency actions on procedure and practice. Far
from being the day to day decisions of internal
management, 70 the agreement sets forth specific methods
and formalized criteria for the administrator to use in
assessing the need for regulation. These rules will control
the nature of the data collected and its subsequent
interpretation, and will have a significant influence on the
substantive decisions reached. 71 Where the content of the
rule "is likely to have considerable impact on ultimate
agency decisions ," it should not be exempt from the public
participation provisions of the APA. 72
The second procedural question concerns the adequacy of
the right to challenge the eventual regulations as an
alternative to participation in the original formulation of
the settlement agreement. 73 The fairness of agency actions,
70. The D.C. Circuit Court characterized the terms of the agreement as being
similar to determinations the agency is "constantly making...concerning how it
will gather information for future rulemaking, which pollutants or industries
should be given special attention, and how limited agency resources are to be
allocated," and noted that the imposition of notice and comment requirements on
such decisions was "untenable." Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 636 F.2d
1229, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1980). These day to day decisions can be distinguished from
the terms of the consent decree, however, by the simple fact that they are not
enforceable by a court order.
71. In requiring notice and comment procedures for the establishment of
emission tests under the Clean Air Act, the court in Donner Hanna Coke Corp. v.
Costle, noted that "the method of determining compliance...can affect the level of
performance required by the standard, even though the standard itself has not
changed." 464 F.Supp. 1295, 1304 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
72. Pickus v. United States Board of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
73. Circumstances have provided an example of just how inadequate this
alternative may be. Paragraph 14 of the Settlement Agreement provided for
regulations to be promulgated to establish standards for certain specified
pollutants in accordance with § 307(a) of the FWPCA. These regulations were
promulgated in accordance with the notice and comment procedures of the APA
and subsequently challenged by the regulated parties. Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol1/iss2/3
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whether rulemaking or adjudication, should meet the
requirements of due process. 74 Since agency regulations are
reviewed with a presumption of regularity, 75 parties
challenging a regulation face substantial obstacles to the
changing of the regulation. 76This difficulty may be
exacerbated by the use of methodologies for the collection
and evaluation of data which were established by
agreement with parties adverse to those challenging the
regulation.77 The risk of erroneous deprivation of a party's
rights is a factor in assessing how much due process should
be given to a third party whose interests are affected by a
F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In upholding the validity of the regulations the court used
a "substantial evidence" test and noted that in reviewing a numerical standard
the proper question is "whether the agency's numbers are within a 'zone of
reasonableness,' not whether its numbers are precisely right." The party
attempting to have the standard modified or revoked bears the burden of
establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the standard established is
not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 107.
Considering the general policy of deferring to agency expertise in matters requiring
technical sophistication, this burden of proof may be essentially impossible to meet.
Even if it can be met, however, it will be only at the cost of additional research
programs conducted with the express goal of refuting data collected by the agency. In
the case of studies required by the consent decree in Citizens for a Better Env't, the
methodologies for data collection and interpretation have been defined by
negotiation between the agency and various environmental groups. The exclusion of
the regulated industries from these negotiations until they were essentially completed
paves the way for the selection of criteria which are biased toward particular results
and which can only be countered by massive quantities of data presenting a different
result. The end result is duplicative, result-oriented research rather than well
designed studies leading to a realistic assessment of the hazards and costs associated
with pollution and pollution control.
74. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Kleindienst, 478 F.2d 1, 12 (3d Cir. 1973).
75. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971);
Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
76. A showing of "substantial prejudice" caused by agency action might be the
basis for a claim that intervenors were denied due process. Ka Fung Chan v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 248, 258 (5th Cir. 1981); Arthur
Murray Dance Studio of Washington, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 458 F.2d 622,
624 (5th Cir. 1972).
77. This is true both in the situation of Citizens for a Better Env't and in the
reverse situation of an environmental group challenging regulations developed
from data collected pursuant to an agreement between an agency and a regulated
industry.
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consent decree. 78 This risk is reduced where alternative
remedies are available. A finding that the available
alternatives are inadequate and that, therefore, insufficient
due process has been accorded, may lead to the consent
decree being later held unenforceable.
C. An Alternative to Consent Decrees
The basis for incorporation of the settlement agreement
in Citizens for a Better Environment into a court order was
the desire to have the agreement enforceable. A consent
decree is not the only means to this end. In exchange for a
stay of litigation, the agency could have promulgated
regulations incorporating the terms of the settlement
agreement. 79 The issuance, after proper notice and
comment, of these regulations would have bound the
agency not to change course "arbitrarily or capriciously."8 0
This course of action would have maximized "public
participation in rulemaking as [a] means of assuring that
an agency's decisions are both informed and responsive."81
IV. Conclusion
This analysis of the consent decree in Citizens for a Better
Environment, reveals a mixed result. The theoretical
benefits to be gained from a negotiated settlement are
indisputable. Nevertheless, actual experience in this case
suggests that a different method might have proved more
effective. While it is true that the agency and the plaintiff
environmental groups have avoided the risks of an
78. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 469 F.Supp.
838, 861 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aff'd, 616 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1980).
79. This approach is proposed by Judge Wilkey in his dissent. Citizens for a
Better Env't, 718 F.2d 1117, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
80. Id. (dissenting opinion, citing Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2865 (1983)). While this alternative does
not supply absolute enforceability, neither does the consent decree which may
always be modified in light of changed circumstances.
81. American Bus. Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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unfavorable outcome, it hardly can be said that substantial
savings of time or money have resulted from reduced
litigation. Further, no benefits will result if the decree
proves to be unenforceable due to a procedural defect.
In determining whether to approve a settlement
agreement, a court should not be unduly swayed by
extensive agency participation in its formulation. Rather, if
the terms of the agreement are in excess of what the court
could impose following a trial, it should insure that the
proper formalities have been conducted to make the
agreement enforceable on its own. If the court then enters
an order, that order will not suffer from the infirmities of an
improper procedural history. The participation of an
agency and one or more self-appointed guardians of the
public interest should not be allowed to substitute for the
flow of information from all interested parties that
Congress envisioned when it enacted the APA. Permitting
only the parties to a lawsuit to participate in the
formulation of mandatory schemes for data collection and
interpretation will only act to encourage litigation against
the agencies. A failure to observe procedural requirements
may also invalidate negotiated settlements and lead to
further litigation. Thus, a consent decree improvidently
issued actually acts contrary to the public interest by
denying "the degree of openness, explanation and
participatory democracy required by the APA,"' 2 and by
leading to economic waste.
Marina T. Larson
82. Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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